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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: How A Current Model in
the Law of Unintended Consequences May Affect
Securities Litigation
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of highly publicized incidents of corporate malfea-
sance, President George W. Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act'
on July 30, 2002, in an effort to rectify the public disclosure and
accounting practice problems brought to light in the preceding ten
months.2 Upon signing Sarbanes-Oxley into law, President Bush
characterized the legislation as "the most far-reaching reforms of
American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt."3 According to legislators, the Act's purpose is to "pro-
tect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corpo-
rate disclosures made pursuant to securities laws." On its face,
Sarbanes-Oxley (hereinafter "SOX" or "Act") succeeds in tackling
major issues revealed during the corporate scandals through the
implementation of governance policies, enhanced financial disclo-
sures, heightened professional responsibility for attorneys and
research analysts, as well as auditor independence.!
SOX is more appropriately characterized as a legislative back-
lash to the extraordinary amount of serious financial disclosure
and reporting transgressions, as well as corporate governance im-
proprieties, which were publicly disclosed in 2001 and 2002. The
Act alters reporting and disclosure regulations for public compa-
nies, increases criminal and civil liability for securities fraud, re-
quires Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Offi-
cers (CFOs) to certify to their company's internal control proce-
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 119 Stat. 745 (codified at scat-
tered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
2. David J. Sorin et al., Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Politics or Reform? Statute's Effects Are
Not as Profound as Legislators Would Have Us Believe, 169 N.J.L.J. 975 (2002).
3. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 31, 2002, at Al.
4. H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002).
5. Sorin, supra note 2, at 975.
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dures, and it also prohibits personal loans from a corporation to its
directors and officers.6
SOX was certainly enacted in the spirit of reform and the provi-
sions, literally read, appear to embody the changes to securities
laws sought by legislators. However, speculation as to the Act's
practical effects began rumbling throughout the legal community
almost immediately after its enactment.7 Critics have deemed the
Act an "illusion of increased accountability"8 and "a mere bandage
for the wound of corporate fraud in America. "'
A. Economic Landscape Preceding the Enactment of Sarbanes-
Oxley
The corporate breakdown and subsequent enactment of SOX
were directly preceded by the "telecom/dot.com infused bubble of
the late 1990's." "1 During this period, the economy was booming.
With this boom came millions of inexperienced investors to the
stock market and, unfortunately, people to Wall Street who left
much to be desired in terms of corporate ethics." Obviously, this
was a dangerous mix. All of this occurred while stock prices were
at all time highs and sixty percent of the financial holdings of
American households were in equity investments. 2
When the telecom/dot.com bubble burst in March 2000, stock
indexes began a rapid descent. 3 Problems of the technological
sphere soon spread to the once venerable corporations, causing
6. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 941 (2003).
7. Sorin et al., supra note 2, at 975.
8. Id. The authors believe that Sarbanes-Oxley "does nothing to provide restitution to
shareholders who have lost their investments and retirement resources as a result of the
recent scandals." Id.
9. STEVEN G. SCHULMAN ET AL., AI-ABA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT: IMPACT ON CIVIL LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS FROM
PLAINTIFFS' PERSPECTIVE 281, 285 (2002).
10. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 923. Cunningham elaborates by stating that the "late
1990's period of economic expansion and technological innovation was of a magnitude that
comes once a generation." Id.
11. Id.
12. David Rynecki, Stock Trading Nears Frenetic Pace of '29 Crash, USA TODAY, Feb.
23, 1999, at B1; Edward Hyatt, Share of Wealth in Stock Holding Hits 50 Year High, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1998, at Al; William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Inves-
tors Got Taken for Trillions by Corporate Insiders, 8 STAN. J.L. & FIN. 69, 70 (2002). More-
over, "individual and institutional investors increased their exposure to the markets to the
highest levels since September 1929." Id. at 70.
13. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 923.
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colossal declines in the market.14 Next came the unimaginable -
September 11, 2001, a heart-wrenching event striking at the cen-
ter of America's financial and political capitals. September 11th
"jolted the markets and caused enormous economic and political
uncertainties." 5 Then, the Enron debauchery began in late 2001,
reaching its boiling point in early 2002.1'
B. Legal Landscape Preceding the Enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley
Before addressing the corporate scandals, which were the gene-
sis of SOX, it is important to summarily note the surrounding le-
gal landscape which preceded those scandals. Recognizing the
legal context in which SOX was enacted is necessary for two pri-
mary reasons. First, SOX was not enacted in a vacuum; securities
transactions occur in a heavily regulated forum. Therefore, other
statutes, rules, regulations, and caselaw will affect the Act's appli-
cation. Second, in the context of securities litigation, the various
other sources of securities law will be vital in the interpretation of
SOX because the legislation will be used in conjunction with,
rather than as an alternative to, other sources of securities law.
SEC Rule 10(b)-5" (hereinafter "10b-5") plays a vital role in se-
curities fraud litigation. 8 10b-5 was created pursuant to section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.19 In 1942, the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5, known as a "utilitarian anti-fraud rem-
edy"" which prohibits fraud "in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security."
21
14. William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for
Trillions by Corporate Insiders, 8 STAN. J. L. & FIN. 69, 70 (2002).
15. Cunningham, supra note 6, 923-24.
16. For detailed analysis of the events surrounding the Enron Corporation in 2001 and
2002, see Cunningham, supra note 6, at 924.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
18. BLOOMENTH, HAROLD S. & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAW § 13:1 (2d ed. 2003).
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1997).
20. BLOOMENTHAL,supra note 18, at §13:1.
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). On the adoption of Rule 10(b)-5, see Sec. Exch. Act.
Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), 13 Fed. Reg. 8177 (1942). Rule 10(b)-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly...
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-




The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 22 (PSLRA) was en-
acted in 1995, overriding the veto of President Clinton. The
PSLRA instituted a strict pleading standard23 under which plain-
tiffs must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference" that defendant(s) acted with the "requisite state of
mind."24  To that end, PSLRA procedural barriers override the
usually applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires
only "notice" pleading.25 The purpose of the PSLRA was to deter
what was labeled as frivolous securities fraud lawsuits of private
plaintiffs, partly by instituting the higher pleading standard.26
Congressional intent underlying the enactment of PSLRA was
also brought about, in part, by a desire to increase the difficulty of
pleading and proving private securities fraud actions against indi-
viduals outside the management control group.27
PSLRA's application is primarily focused on the 10b-5 actions of
private plaintiffs." As a result, in an action alleging a violation
of 10b-5, failure to properly plead the scienter requirement sub-
jects plaintiffs to motions to dismiss, which pursuant to the
PSLRA, stays discovery.29 In terms of the application of PSLRA to
allegations of 10b-5 violations, the trend seems to be that reck-
lessness constitutes a sufficient showing of scienter. ° The PSLRA
contains a circular deficiency in that it requires pleadings that
state facts with particularity, which can be an impossible task
without the aid of discovery. 1 However, under the PSLRA, dis-
covery is stayed until the complaint states facts with particularity.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
22. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
(codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
23. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 939.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1997).
25. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 18, at §13:1.
26. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 939.
27. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 286.
28. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 18, at §13:1. Specifically, "[t]he race to the courthouse
by lawyers to file class actions upon the announcement of bad news resulting in a sharp
decline of the market price of the company's stock provided much of the impetus for the
PSLRA and such private actions are based almost exclusively on alleged violations of Rule
10b-5." Id.
29. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 18, at §13:1.
30. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 289. For cases holding that recklessness satis-
fies the scienter requirement of Rule 10(b)-5 actions, see, e.g., In re Advanta, 180 F.3d 525
(3d Cir. 1999); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Comshare, 183 F.3d 542
(6th Cir. 1999).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
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Beyond instituting a heightened pleading standard, PSLRA dis-
allowed joint and several liability,2 replacing it with proportionate
liability, and adopted a protective safe harbor period33 for "forward
looking" information.' The final blow to securities fraud plaintiffs
came with the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
199835 (SLUSA), which abolished class actions for securities fraud
instituted in state courts.
36
The Supreme Court's decision in Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A., v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,37 held that liability for viola-
tions of federal securities laws shall be imposed only upon primary
violators, to the exclusion of aiding abetting liability for secondary
actors such as attorneys, accountants, and auditors, who in some
manner facilitate the fraud.38 Further, in 1999, Congress repealed
important aspects of the Banking Act of 193339 (Glass-Steagall
Act), namely the "strict separation of the commercial and invest-
ment banking industries " ° contained in Glass-Steagall.4 Under
the Banking Act, commercial banks collected deposits, extended
credit, and serviced corporate customers, while investment banks
underwrote the public offerings of securities.42 The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999,13 removed many of the
former barriers between the two industries creating potential con-
flicts of interest in that the same bank may now engage in a com-
mercial relationship with a corporate customer and also sell its
securities to a public market.'
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2) (1997).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(b) (1997). It should be noted that the foundation for a 10(b)-
5 action often stems from projections or other forward looking statements concerning a
company's securities and those statements are then alleged to be false or misleading.
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 18, at §13:1. Thus, the PSLRA "safe harbor" is implicated in all
such cases. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 18, at §13:1.
34. John C. Coffee, Understanding Enron: It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid. 57 BUS.
LAW 1403, 1409-10 (2002).
35. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
36. §101, 112 Stat. at 3228.
37. 511U.S. 164 (1994).
38. Coffee, supra note 33, at 1409 (proposing the potential for laxity among gatekeepers
such as lawyers, accountants, auditors where they are aware that they have no personal
liability at stake).
39. Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C. § 1988).
40. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 940.
41. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (2000).
42. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 940.
43. 12 U.S.C. § 377.
44. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 940.
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C. Corporate Malfeasance Incites Legislative "Reform"
During the beginning of the new millenium, America was
fraught with tales of corporate wrongdoing; ranging from account-
ing fraud and corporate governance laxity to startling abuses of
corporate loan programs by directors and officers. The collective
breakdown resulted in plummeting stock prices, investigations by
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and massive corpo-
rate bankruptcies.45
The first major scandal involved Enron, a world leader in pro-
viding energy sources, commodities, and related services."
Through a lattice-work of suspect accounting methods and flat out
fraud, Enron moved billions of dollars in debt off its balance sheet
into a system of complex partnerships.47 The company's auditor,
the then prominent accounting firm of Arthur Anderson, signed off
on many of the transactions."'
In late 2001, Enron disclosed that the company would sustain
losses of up to $1 billion and would have to restate financial re-
cords from 1997 through the second quarter of 2001 in order to
clear up errors and irregularities that had inflated its net income
by more than $500 million. 9 Especially disconcerting were a
number of related party transactions between Enron and partner-
ships it had created wherein Enron's senior executives held sub-
stantial interests."° These related party transactions were not dis-
closed on balance sheets, and Enron's interest in the partnerships
was so substantial that they should have been treated as consoli-
dated entities, rather than minority investments. Once the re-
statements occurred, Enron's stock price dropped by over ninety
percent, and on December 2, 2001, the company filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection.51 At the time, Enron's bankruptcy filing
45. Michael A. Perino, Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deter-
rence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671, 671-72 (2002).
46. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 297. Some of Enron's business activities in-
cluded the marketing of electricity and natural gas, delivering energy and physical com-
modities, and providing financial and risk management services. Id.
47. Id. at 297; Richard A. Oppel & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Collapses as Suitor
Cancels Plans for Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at Al.
48. Id. at 297; Kranhold et al., Following the Trial: As Enron Inquiry Intensifies, Mid-
level Players Face Spotlight. WALL ST. J., April 30, 2002, at Al.
49. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 298.
50. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 929.
51. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 298.
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was the largest in United States history and listed over $13 billion
in debt.5"
Arthur Anderson, Enron's outside auditor, with an eye towards
its own involvement in the scandal, began destroying documents
that could have evidenced wrongdoing at a fevered pace.53  The
firm was later indicted and convicted of obstruction of justice as a
result of the document destruction.54 By May 2002, the Enron de-
bacle incited Congressional hearings and various reform bills as
the country began what SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt called "an
incredible journey to modernize securities regulation."55 The En-
ron scandal gripped the media's attention for sometime. However,
the story began to fade as issues concerning accounting and dis-
closure transgressions, insiders' apparent conflicts of interest and
breaches of fiduciary duties, huge revenue declines, and insider
trading were exposed at some of America's most prominent corpo-
rations .56
Global Crossing provided telecommunication services through
100,000 miles of fiber optic network." As was common in the tele-
communications industry, Global Crossing engaged in capacity
swaps with other telecommunications companies wherein compa-
nies would buy and sell rights to use each others fiber capacities.
There were many instances where Global Crossing sold its fiber
rights in the last two days of the second quarter in an effort to in-
crease the company's stated revenues."
Much of Global Crossing's inflated profits were attributed to the
use of pro forma reporting, a technique that tends to conceal many
expenses that otherwise appear on the balance sheet when Gener-
52. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE § 1 (2002); Re-
becca Smith, Enron Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A3. For
Enron's Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition, see In re: Enron Corp., Debtor, Voluntary Peti-
tion, Chapter 11 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr.) 20XX WL 1539315 (2001).
53. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 929.
54. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 51, at § 1. For a more detailed discussion of Arthur
Anderson's involvement in the Enron scandal, see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE, § 5 (2002).
55. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 51, at § 1; Michael Schroeder & Greg Hitt, Accounting
Industry Is Taken to Task, WALL ST. J. (Online ed.), Mar. 8, 2002.
56. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 51, at § 1.
57. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 298; Dennis K. Berman & Deborah Soloman,
Optical Illusions?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at Al.
58. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 298-99.
59. Id.; See also Dennis K Berman & Deborah Soloman, Optical Illusion? WALL ST. J.,
February 13, 2002, at Al.
Winter 2004 299
Duquesne Law Review
ally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are used." Further,
the company's outside auditor, Arthur Anderson, signed off on an-
nual reports which utilized the pro forma method.61 In 2001,
Global Crossing's Chairman, Gary Winnick, unloaded more than
$100 million worth of stock claiming that he had no knowledge of
Global Crossing's substantial revenue declines.62
In January 2002, Global Crossing filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy protection.63 Congressional concern over conduct exhibited
during the Global Crossing scandal probably influenced the crea-
tion of the Public Oversight Accounting Board in SOX.' The
Board's stated purpose is "[t]o oversee the audit of public compa-
nies that are subject to securities laws .. .in order to protect the
interests of investors and further public interest in the prepara-
tion of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports." 5
Like Global Crossing, WorldCom was also a global communica-
tions giant.66 Initially, attention was focused on WorldCom's ac-
counting procedures when an internal audit revealed $500 million
in fraudulent expenses." Further investigation resulted in the
discovery of substantial accounting irregularities.68 The revela-
tions of accounting impropriety at WorldCom was even more as-
tounding because the fraud perpetrated was elementarily simple
and had not involved a complex scheme as in the Enron case.6 9
WorldCom inflated its profits in the amount of $3.8 billion by
treating the payments it had made for the use of other companies'
lines, which are appropriately treated as operating expenses, as
capital expenditures. 0 When properly accounted for, the line use
60. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 930. Cunningham explains that many companies
prefer to use pro forma reporting because it allows the company to ignore many items
GAAP considers expenses such as commissions, disbursements to start new subsidiaries,
and marketing and personnel costs. Id.
61. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 931.
62. Sarah Laitner, Winnick Heard No Warning on Global Crossing, FIN. TIMES, October
2, 2002, at C4.
63. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 299; see also Bloomberg News, Concern to Re-
state Results, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at C12.
64. § 101, 116 Stat. at 750.
65. § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 750.
66. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 300.
67. Susan Pulliam & Deborah Solomon, Uncooking The Books, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30,
2002, at Al; Jared Sandberg and Susan Pulliam, Leading News: WorldCom Revisions Tops
$7 Billion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2002, at A3.
68. Pulliam, supra note 66, at Al; Sandberg & Susan Pulliam, supra note 66, at A3.
69. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 51, at § 1; Jesse Drucker & Henry Sender, Sorry, Wrong
Number: Strategy Behind Accounting Scheme, WALL ST. J., Jun. 26, 2002, at A9.
70. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 934-35.
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payments should be deducted from revenues in determining net
income." However, treated as capital expenditures, the line use
payments were not deducted in determining net income, thereby
bolstering the profit margin.
When expenses are capitalized in this manner, a true picture of
a company's financial condition is nearly unattainable. This prac-
tice was so egregiously abused in the WorldCom case that the im-
proper capitalizations could have been easily identified by internal
controls, or, at a minimum, revealed during the outside audit.72
One would imagine such defective internal controls would have
been caught by the external audit conducted again by the once
venerable Arthur Anderson.73 Unfortunately, Anderson failed to
identify the accounting irregularities. WorldCom's abuse of sim-
ple, run of the mill, accounting deception worked to shed light
upon failures of the company's internal accounting procedures.
Concern over failures in internal control procedures are evidenced
by the certification provisions of SOX,74 which require, inter alia, a
company's CFO and CEO to certify to the truthfulness of quarterly
and annual reports75 and further, certify to "establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls"76 designed to "ensure that mate-
rial information relating to the [company] is made known to the
[certifying officer]."77
In June 2002, WorldCom announced $3.8 billion in inflated prof-
its; an announcement which lead Nasdaq to force a halt on trading
of the company's stock.78 Former WorldCom executives, Scott Sul-
livan and Buford Yates, Jr., were indicted on charges of securities
fraud for allegedly hiding billions in expenses from investors and
auditors. 9 WorldCom's accounting irregularities were ultimately
found to be approximately $9 billion. ° In July of 2002, WorldCom
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, surpassing Enron as
the largest filing in United States history."
71. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 51, at § 1.
72. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 936.
73. Id.
74. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777-778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
75. § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 777.
76. § 302(a)(4), 116 Stat. at 777.
77. Id.
78. Jared Sandberg et al., Disconnected: Inside WorldCom's Unearthing of Vast Ac-
counting Scandal, WALL ST. J., Jun. 27, 2002 at Al.
79. Mark Hamblett, Two Ex-WorldCom Executives Indicted for Securities Fraud, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 8, 2002, at 1 (col. 4).
80. Solomon, supra note 66, at Al.
81. Hamblett, supra note 78, at 1.
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Adelphia was a leading cable provider where Chairman and
CEO John Rigas, who founded Adelphia, sat on the company's
nine member Board of Directors with five other Rigas family
members, including his three sons.82 The Rigas family used Adel-
phia as their personal money tree, borrowing $2.3 million through
various family owned partnerships.83 Unfortunately, all such
transactions occurred off the balance sheets so that shareholders
had no means of knowing about the massive borrowing taking
place within the company.
Tyco International is a Bermuda based conglomerate operating
in more than 100 countries providing electronics, engineered
products and services, healthcare and specialty products, and fire
and security services." Tyco's corporate loan programs were insti-
tuted to aid employees in paying taxes on company stock and for
relocation near Tyco's Manhattan headquarters.85 Through this
program, Tyco's CEO and CFO each took in hundreds of millions
of dollars which they, acting through the Board of Directors, later
forgave.86 Both the Tyco and Adelphia scandals are implicated in
a section of SOX that prohibit personal loans to officers or direc-
tors or their immediate families.87
II. NEW SECURITIES LITIGATION ISSUES EMERGE IN THE POST-
SARBANES-OXLEY FORUM
The Act, spurred by the highly publicized corporate scandals,
deflated market indexes, and a growing concern amongst the con-
82. Susan Pilliam & Deborah Solomon, Adelphia Faces Irate Shareholders, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 4, 2002, at C1.
83. Id.
84. SCHULMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 299.
85. Id. at 299-300.
86. Id.
87. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 402, 116 Stat. at 787 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)). Sena-
tor Feinstein's statement on the Senate floor expresses concern over what was viewed as
abusive loan programs brought to light during the scandals, saying that "[u]nder an
amendment sponsored by Senator Schumer and myself, company loans to executive officers
are now prohibited, sharply limiting the types of 'hidden' compensation that can be offered
to executives without being fully disclosed to shareholders." 148 CONG. REC. S6762 (daily
ed. July 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). Commentators have criticized § 402 as
overbroad in that "the sweep of the actual language used to effect the Congressional intent
also appears to prohibit a wide variety of perfectly normal corporate transactions that,
arguably, take the form of a 'loan' or an 'extension on credit.'" Martin E. Lybecker at al.,
Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Devil may Have Been the Draftsman, 6 No. 5
WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE, 1 2, available at
http://www.wallstreetlawyer.com (copy on file with author).
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stituency flew through the legislative process with record speed."
This fast paced promulgation resulted in little formal legislative
history regarding the Act because few hearings were held and
meaningful debate as to certain provisions was lacking." As a re-
sult, issues, then unforeseen by legislators, have emerged." The
unanticipated consequences in terms of the Act's affect on private
securities litigation are of primary importance because Congress
did not include any measures in SOX, which would modify the
PSLRA pleading requirements or in any way directly help plain-
tiffs bring a private action under securities legislation.9 As a re-
sult, any significant change in the arena of private securities liti-
gation will be bornof the interpretation of SOX, as opposed to any
directive specifically enumerated therein. The possibility, or more
aptly, the high probability, that the plaintiffs' bar will go through
SOX with a fine-toothed comb, with hopes that the legislation will
reveal new authority for private securities fraud claims, is surely
of great interest to corporate counsel.
Stanford's Professor Joseph Grundfest, a former SEC Commis-
sioner, who works with the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse,
was quoted in reference to Sarbanes-Oxley's impact on securities
litigation as saying "[i]t is more opportunities for plaintiffs law-
yers .... [t]here's no doubt about that."92  Notwithstanding Mr.
Grundfest's opinion, language expressing a definite intent to mod-
ify requirements applicable to private securities litigation is con-
spicuously absent from the Act, as well as SEC regulations
adopted thereunder. However, from a practitioner's perspective,
the new provisions and regulations may affect private causes of
action for alleged violations of securities laws. Courts will be
forced to address provisions of the Act that could alter private se-
88. Charles Toutant, Lawyers Jump on Marketing Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley:
Confusion Reigns over New Law, and That's Good News for the Legal Business, 169 N.J.L.J.
977 (2002). Toutant notes "[w]ritten by politicians rushing to respond to public outrage
over corporate scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is filled with ambiguous and con-
flicting provisions, some lawyers say." Id. "Major legislation always has some unintended
consequences, and that is particularly true when the legislation passes quickly and without
the usual formal legislative history." John C. Coffee, Jr., Leading Issues under Sarbanes-
Oxley, Part I, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 2002, at 5.
89. Stanley S. Arkin & Charles S. Sullivan, Potential Misuse of Weapons in War on
Corporate Malfeasance, N.Y. L.J., May 12, 2003, at 3.
90. Coffee, supra note 87, at 5.
91. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE § 74 (2002).
92. Richard B. Schmitt et al., Corporate-Oversight Bill Passes, Smooths Way for New
Lawsuits. WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at Al; BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 90, at § 74.
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curities litigation before one can ultimately decipher the long term
impact of the legislation in such matters.93 Accordingly, the fol-
lowing discussion is an effort to identify certain portions of the
Act, which may provide some insight into the issues courts will be
faced with in the future when dealing with SOX.
A. Practical Effects of an Extended Limitation Period for Private
Securities Fraud Claims
The Act incorporates the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Ac-
countability Act of 2002, and as added by an amendment in the
Senate, includes a statute of limitations applicable to private ac-
tions for securities fraud.94 The Act alters the statute of limita-
tions applicable to violations of securities laws, which represents
the "sole direct change to shareholder litigation."95 Before the en-
actment of SOX, a private cause of action pursuant to the Securi-
ties Act of 193396 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"7 must
have been brought no later than the earlier of one year after a
party was aware of the injury or was on "inquiry notice"98 of the
violation, or three years from the date of the last violation.99
Sarbanes-Oxley modifies the limitations period for private
claims involving allegations of fraud, deceit, or manipulation. '00
Under SOX's new limitations period such claims must be brought
no later than the earlier of either two years after discovery of facts
constituting the violation or five years from the date of the viola-
93. Schmitt et al., supra note 91, at Al. " Obviously some lawsuits are going to spring
up out of some of the regulatory provisions, but only time will tell if its going to be a trickle
or a torrent,' said Patrick McGurn, a vice president at Institutional Shareholder Services, a
proxy advisory firm in Maryland." Id.
94. § 804, 116 Stat. at 801 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1658).
95. Jessica P. Corley, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and New Exchange Proposals:
Dealing with the Resulting Risk of Private Litigation, 27 SEC. LITIG. FORMS & ANALYSIS,
§1.2 (2003).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2003).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 77b et seq. (2003).
98. Controlling case law defined "inquiry notice" as "the term used for knowledge of
facts that would lead a reasonable person to begin investigating the possibility that his
legal rights had been infringed." Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1228 (11th Cir. 2001).
99. Corley, supra note 94, at § 1.2.
100. § 804(b), which institutes the extended limitations period, reads as follows:
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a private right of action that involves a claim of
fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory require-
ment concerning the securities laws, as defined in Section 3(a)(47) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47)), may be brought not later than the ear-
lier of (1) 2 years after discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years
after such violation.
28 U.S.C. § 1658
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tion.' The Act does not alter the limitations period for claims
that do not involve allegations of "fraud, deceit, or manipulation or
contrivance in contravention of regulatory requirements" 102 ac-
tionable under the Securities Act of 1933,103 The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,"' the Investment Advisors Act of 1940,105 the
Trust Indenture Act,0 6 or the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935.107
However, this provision of the Act does work to extend the limi-
tations period for 10b-5 claims. In the Congressional Section by
Section Analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley, Senator Leahy described the
new limitations period as "[i]ntended to lengthen any Statute of
Limitations under federal securities laws, and to shorten none....
[t]he section, by its plain terms, applies to any and all cases filed
after the effective date of the Act, regardless of when the underly-
ing conduct occurred."108
This language indicates that the new limitations period under
section 804 of Sarbanes-Oxley may apply retroactively. Indeed, in
March of 2003, the district court in Roberts v. DeanWitterl°9 held
that the Act applied retroactively to lengthen the limitations pe-
riod for claims that arose before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley
in July 2002, but were filed after its enactment."0 In Roberts, at
issue were trades made in early 1998, which plaintiff alleged were
unsuitable and unauthorized."' Pursuant to the limitations pe-
riod applicable before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the plain-
tiffs cause of action would have been outside the three-year limi-
tations period in 2001. However, under the new five-year period
in Section 804, plaintiffs cause of action was still viable.'12
Normally, courts are unwilling to retroactively apply a statute
of limitations in absence of a clear expression of Congressional
intent.' In the Roberts case, the court relied, in part, on statu-
101. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 804.
102. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 90, at § 74 (quoting Sarbanes-Oxley Act, §804(a)
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1658, by adding subsection (b)).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77a.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77b.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 80a et seq. (2002).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb et seq. (2002).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 79a et seq. (2002).
108. 148 CONG. REC. S7418 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
109. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5676 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2003).
110. Roberts, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5676, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2003).
111. Id. at *5.
112. Id. at *89, 12.
113. Id. at *8 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Seale, 13 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1994)).
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tory language in § 804(b) of the Act providing that the lengthened
limitations period applies to a "proceeding ... commenced on or
after the enactment of this Act. " 114 The court reasoned that had
Congress intended the statute to apply prospectively only, the
language would have referred to violations occurring after the
statute's enactment. 1'5  Congressional reasoning behind the
lengthened limitations period is premised upon the belief that a
longer statute of limitations will allow defrauded investors a more
meaningful opportunity at redress where the perpetrators have
concealed evidence of the fraud."6
Micheal A. Perino, Visiting Professor at Columbia University
School of Law, examined a detailed sample of one hundred and
sixty securities fraud class actions filed from July 1998 to June
2001 to determine the efficiency of the former, more restrictive
statute of limitations."' On average, the examined claims were
brought within fifty-five days of the end of the class period.'
Nearly ninety percent of the claims were brought within six
months of disclosure of the alleged misconduct. 9 Both statistics
indicate that the plaintiffs' bar was accustomed to, if not adept at,
bringing claims within one year of discovery of the misconduct,
which is clearly within the former limitations period. The Enron
and WorldCom transgressions are perfect examples. In both
cases, there were class actions filed within days of accounting re-
statements by the two companies.'
20
Currently, the impact of the extension of the limitations period
remains unclear. Section 804, which creates the extended statute
of limitations expressly states that nothing contained therein
"shall create a new, private right of action." 2' Although the new
provision represents a substantial increase in the time allowed for
114. Id. at *8-9.
115. Roberts, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *9, 11-12.
116. Perino, supra note 44 (citing 148 CONG. REC. S6437 (daily ed. July 9, 2003) (state-




120. Perino, supra note 44; Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP Commences a
Class Action Litigation Against WorldCom, Inc., Bernard J. Ebbers, Scott D. Sullivan, and
Arthur Anderson, LLP, PR NEWSWIRE, June 27, 2002; Milberg Weiss Announces Class
Action Suit Against Enron Corp., BUS. WIRE, October 22, 2001.
121. § 804(c), 116 Stat. at 801. "This provision states that it is not meant to create any
new private cause of action, but only to govern all the already existing private causes of
action under various federal securities laws that have been held to support private causes
of action." 148 CONG. REC. S7418 (daily ed. July 26, 2002).
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bringing certain private causes of action under securities laws, it
may not effect the quantity and feasibility of applicable claims
because most are filed immediately upon publication of substan-
tial declines of the corporation's stock price.
2
1
Alternatively, section 804 will affect securities litigation in a
practical sense because extending the limitations period will work
to lengthen the class period, which in turn affects the calculation
of damages and class size.2 3 Issues may arise as to subclasses,
choice of lead counsel and lead plaintiff, along with increased diffi-
culty reaching agreements as to settlement arrangements. 4 Fur-
thermore, a longer limitations period could allow the plaintiffs' bar
to gather information that may reveal claims against attorneys,
auditors and bankers, rather than just the company itself.125
B. Use of Shareholder Derivative Suits to Enforce SOX Provi-
sions
A more subtle issue, as to the impact of SOX, on securities liti-
gation stems from the forfeiture provision contained in section
304.26 Section 304 provides for the forfeiture of bonus, incentive,
or equity based compensation or any profits received from stock
trades by a CEO or CFO where the issuer was required to restate
financial statements because of any wrongful, material noncom-
pliance with a financial reporting requirement under the Act.'27
This provision fails to identify which party would have the right to
enforce the prohibition contained therein. Should the right to dis-
gorgement under section 304 be vested in the corporation itself,
which one would assume is the case, there lies a potential for
shareholder derivative actions should the corporation fail to de-
mand that executives relinquish the funds.2 8
122. Robert J. Jossent & Neil A. Steiner, Using Sarbanes-Oxley in Securities Litigation,




126. § 304, 116 Stat. at 777.
127. § 304(a), 116 Stat. at 777.
128. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 90, § 74. According to Bloomenthal, "this provision on
its face could apply retroactively" to financial restatements "made after enactment of the
Act, but pertaining to financial periods prior to adoption of the Act." Id. at § 65. That pos-
sibility raises an issue for two reasons. First, it is unknown which party can assert a claim
under the provision. Id. Second, the provision contains no statute of limitations so such
issues may arise for an indefinite period of time. Id.
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In contrast, section 306 makes it unlawful for an officer or direc-
tor to acquire or trade the issuer's equity securities if received in
connection with that officer's or director's service, during a pen-
sion fund blackout period."9 This provision expressly allows ac-
tions by the corporation to recover the funds and also authorizes
shareholder derivative suits where the corporation fails to demand
disgorgement."' Therefore, CEO's and CFO's who violate section
304 have valid arguments that had Congress intended section 304
to be subject to enforcement through shareholder derivative suits,
the Act would have explicitly called for such remedy in a manner
similar to the language contained in section 306. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's ruling in Burks v. Lasker,"' holds that a Board of
Directors may terminate a shareholder derivative suit if allowed
by state law even where the claim alleges a non-frivolous cause of
action for violation of federal law."2 As a result, valid shareholder
derivative suits under either section may be properly terminated
by the company's board.
C. Arguments Abound as to the Existence of an Implied Private
Right of Action Under Sarbanes-Oxley
Any discussion of SOX's projected impact on securities litigation
begs the question of whether an implied private right of action
exists under any of the various prohibitions contained in the Act.
If courts allow an implied private right of action for conduct pro-
scribed by SOX, the result could be a shift away from the ordinary
10b-5 action and towards remedies that would hold defendants
accountable for specific conduct prohibited by SOX. Alternatively,
should courts refuse to recognize implied private rights of action
pursuant to SOX provisions, plaintiffs will be forced to rely pri-
marily on 10b-5 actions when alleging securities fraud, and they
will also have to continue to satisfy PSLRA requirements.
With the exception of two provisions discussed below, the Act
contains no language permitting or restricting implied private
rights of action in terms of the numerous SOX sections, which cre-
ate criminal violations and make specific conduct or omissions
unlawful. 3' The first exception is section 804 of SOX, which
129. § 30 6 (a), 116 Stat. at 779.
130. § 306(a)(2)(B), 116 Stat. at 779.
131. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
132. Burks, 441 U.S. at 485.
133. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 90, § 74.
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lengthens the limitations period for claims involving securities
fraud and expressly states that no new, private cause of action is
created." Second, section 303 of SOX contains a provision which
makes it unlawful for an officer or director of a public company to
fraudulently influence or mislead auditors engaged in auditing the
company's financial statements."5 This section states on its face
that the SEC has exclusive authority to enforce the provision.
3 6
Clearly, Congress could have included a clause stating that
nothing contained in the Act shall be deemed to create an implied
private right of action. Alternatively, it could be countered that
an express private cause of action could have easily been provided
for if Congress so intended. The Supreme Court, in Cort v. Ash,137
laid out the framework under which determinations of whether an
implied private right of action exists shall be made.138 Plaintiffs'
counsel, who wish to allege an implied private cause of action pur-
suant to a provision of SOX, will have to show that (1) the plaintiff
is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted,"39 (2) an "indication of legislative intent, explicitly or im-
plicitly, to create such a remedy or to deny one," 4' (3) implying
such a remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme in question,"' and (4) the cause of action is not
one traditionally relegated to state law, so that inferring a cause
of action under federal law would not be inappropriate.
1 2
D. Sarbanes-Oxley Certification Provisions May Provide New
Forms of Proof for Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud Cases
The certification provisions of SOX may have the most pervasive
impact on securities litigation. This is so because the certification
provisions are inescapably intertwined with 10b-5 actions and the
PSLRA pleading requirements. Section 302 of the Act requires
the SEC to implement rules under which principal executive and
financial officers of public companies certify to the general truth-
134. § 804(c), 116 Stat. at 801 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1658).
135. § 303(a), 116 Stat. at 778.
136. § 303(b), 116 Stat. at 778.
137. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
138. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
139. Id. at 78 (quoting Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 214 U.S. 33 (1916)).





fulness of the company's quarterly and annual reports.4 3 The cer-
tification would require officers to state that based on his or her
knowledge, the report does not contain any material misprepre-
sentations or omit any material fact otherwise necessary to make
the other disclosures not misleading.'" Additionally, the report
has to identify the officer's basis for making the certification and
each officer must certify that he or she and other officers are "re-
sponsible for establishing and maintaining" disclosure controls
and procedures. Consequently, disclosure controls must be de-
signed "to ensure that material information relating to the issuer.
is made known to [the certifying officer]." 46
The certifying officers must also certify to having "evaluated the
effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls" and procedures
within the previous ninety days and have "presented in the report
their conclusions about the effectiveness" of the disclosure controls
and procedures. 47  Moreover, certifying officers must sign off on
having disclosed to audit committees and auditors any significant
deficiencies in internal control procedures as well as any fraud,
whether material or not.
48
Neither section 302 nor its implementing regulations make any
reference to the creation of a private cause of action or indicate an
intent to modify securities fraud pleading requirements under the
PSLRA. 14  It is clear that the new certification requirements will
increase the probability that a company will have to restate earn-
ings, an act which often directly precedes shareholder litigation."'
The usual route for officers and directors facing 10b-5 liability is
to plead lack of knowledge or specific intent by relying on failures
in the PSLRA's proof of scienter requirement to avoid liability for
143. § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 777. The periodic reports subject to §302 and SEC rules
promulgated thereunder are located in §§ 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 15 U.S.C. 78m, 78o(d); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14(b)(2).
144. § 302(a)(2), 116 Stat. at 777; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14(b)(2).
145. § 302(a)(4), 116 Stat. at 777; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14(b)(4).
146. Id. The certification provisions implicitly require the establishment of internal
control systems sufficient to make information available to certifying officers. HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE, § 33 (2002).
147. § 302(a)(4)(C)(D), 116 Stat. at 777
148. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 302(a)(5)(A), (B), 116 Stat. at 777. Further, Sections 906(a)
and 906(b) require that each periodic report filed by the issuer with the SEC is accompa-
nied by a statement by the CEO or CFO certifying that the report fairly represents the
financial condition of the issuer on all material respects. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 906(a), 116
Stat. at 806 (amending 18 U.S.C. by adding § 1350).
149. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 90, at § 74.
150. Schmitt et al., supra note 91, at AL.
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having signed off on deficient reports. 51 In an effort to counter
such arguments, the SEC implemented rules pursuant to the cer-
tification provision of section 302, which specifically mandated
that false certifications would expose the CEO and/or CFO to pri-
vate causes of action under 10b-5.1
52
Even prior to the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley and its new certi-
fication requirements, CEOs and CFOs were often named as de-
fendants in private securities fraud litigation and the SEC was
taking action pursuant to its authority against the individual offi-
cers. "'53 A longstanding requirement under 10b-5 compels plaintiffs
to plead scienter or the intent to commit fraud.15 ' The PSLRA in-
creases the difficulty of commencing securities fraud actions by
strengthening the scienter requirement so that pleadings alleging
a 10b-5 violation must contain specific allegations of fact giving
rise to a "strong inference" that the named defendants acted with
the requisite scienter. 5  Until a plaintiff can establish such a
"strong inference" of scienter, he or she is vulnerable to a motion
to dismiss and at minimum, is unable to proceed to discovery,
where there lies the greatest potential to obtain proof of scienter.
Certification requirements may enable an easier passage for
private litigants to meet the enhanced pleading requirements of
the PSLRA in that the Act, literally unchanged by SOX, mandates
pleadings which create a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the requisite state of mind. The scienter standard for securi-
ties fraud claims requires a showing of the defendant's knowledge
or, at bare minimum, reckless disregard of the alleged misrepre-
sentations. 56 As a result, a cause of action for securities fraud
cannot withstand containing allegations of merely negligent, or
even grossly negligent, misrepresentations on the part of the de-
fendants.'57
Prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, courts contemplating
the PSLRA's pleading standards found boilerplate allegations in
reference to a given defendant's knowledge of misrepresentations
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Sorin et al., supra note 2, at 978.
154. Id.
155. Id. However, it should be noted that exact requirements for alleging scienter vary
by circuit. Id. See, e.g., Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2001) (typifies a
more flexible interpretation of the PSLRA scienter requirement); In re Silicon Graphics,
Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (example of a more stringent interpretation).




or omissions unconvincing.158 However, SOX certification provi-
sions requiring the establishment and maintenance of internal
control systems may persuade courts that a strong inference the
defendant acted with the requisite scienter exists and once past
the PSLRA pleading requirements, discovery will reveal the exis-
tence of internal reports effectively resolving the issue of an indi-
vidual defendant's knowledge or lack thereof.
159
There are two primary ways in which the SOX certification pro-
visions could be used to further the securities fraud suits of pri-
vate plaintiffs. First, the certifications could be used as evidence
from which defendant's knowledge of the misrepresentations or
reckless disregard of them could be inferred. Second, the certifica-
tion itself could be used as direct evidence of defendant's knowl-
edge or reckless disregard.
Pursuant to the first theory, plaintiffs would use certification
requirements as circumstantial evidence of the particular defen-
dant's knowledge of the misrepresentations or reckless disregard
of their truth or falsity. In essence, this argument would use a
certification containing a misrepresentation as to the company's
financial condition against the certifying officer or director to infer
that that officer or director had knowledge of the misrepresenta-
tion. Potential plaintiffs could further extend this theory by alleg-
ing facts which would buttress an inference that corporate officers
certified to their disclosure procedures in reckless disregard of the
company's subpar internal controls or lack thereof.6 ' Such an ex-
tension would allow potential plaintiffs to argue that the named
defendants had knowledge of all misrepresentations as to the
company's financial condition occurring within the reporting pe-
riod subject to those allegedly deficient internal controls.
Pursuant to the second theory, plaintiffs would allege that the
certification itself is direct evidence of the particular defendant's
knowledge of the misrepresentation or reckless disregard of
them. 6' Consequently, the certification would provide the "par-
ticular facts" that the PSLRA requires of plaintiffs' pleadings so
158. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 90, at § 74.
159. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 90, at § 74. According to Bloomenthal, certification
requirements "will make it much more difficult for the certifying officer as defendants in a
private action to claim they did not know and should aid plaintiffs in meeting pleading
requirements ofPSLRA." Id.
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that, in theory, plaintiffs could overcome a motion to dismiss and
thereby, proceed to discovery.
E. Sarbanes-Oxley Muddies the Water for Determinations of
Whether One is a "Primary Violator" in Securities Fraud
Cases
According to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Cen-
tral Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, there
is no liability under 10b5 for the aiding and abetting of securities
fraud.62 In effect, this means that liability for violations of securi-
ties laws extends only to primary actors.'63 The ruling in Central
Bank worked to shield many accountants, lawyers, and banking
institutions from liability for actions in furtherance of fraud per-
petrated by primary violators. The jurisprudence after the deci-
sion in Central Bank holds persons liable only if he or she actually
made the false or misleading statements or specifically acquiesced
or adopted others' false or misleading statements.16
SOX may also alter the liability of attorneys who in some man-
ner facilitate a violation of securities laws, although no private
cause of action is specifically created. 165 The liability of attorneys
may be modified by SOX because proving that a particular lawyer
was a primary actor in reference to 10b-5 violations may now be a
less difficult task.'66 Rules implemented by the SEC pursuant to
authority granted in SOX may affect the liability of an attorney
who supplies legal services to an issuer in connection with the
preparation of documents filed with or submitted to the SEC. 67
The liability of attorneys is affected because pursuant to those
Rules, the attorney could be viewed as a primary actor in securi-
ties fraud based on the rationale that an attorney "speaks" by al-
lowing his or her work to be employed in the filing of documents
162. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. It should be noted that § 703 of the Act requires the
SEC to study aiding and abetting violations that go unsanctioned. § 703, 116 Stat. at 798.
This seems to be an anomaly as conduct deemed "aiding and abetting" another's securities
fraud is carries no civil liability so that it should never be sanctioned in the first place.
Perhaps, this study can be read as questioning the continuing validity of the Supreme
Court's holding in Central Bank.
163. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177.
164. See, e.g., Dinco v. Dylex Ltd., 111 F.3d 964, 968 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Fidel-
ity/Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F.Supp. 539, 544 (D. Mass. 1997); In re Prudential Ins. Co. Sales
Practices Litig., 975 F.Supp. 584, 612 (D.N.J. 1996); Converse, Inc. v. Norwood Venture
Corp., No. 96CIV3745(HB), 1997 WL 742534, at 3 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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with the SEC that contain false or materially misleading state-
ments or omissions.'68 As the analysis continues, potential plain-
tiffs could argue that the attorney adopted or acquiesced to those
statements, thus establishing himself or herself as a primary vio-
lator in accordance with the standard set forth in Central Bank.
Prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and pursuant to the rul-
ing in Central Bank, such conduct would have been viewed only as
"aiding and abetting" another's perpetration of securities fraud,
for which the attorney would not be liable.'69  It is unknown
whether Sarbanes-Oxley could be used to subject attorneys to 10b-
5 liability. However, such attorney liability may be unlikely as
the above analysis is held together by somewhat tenuous bonds
which may be easily attacked by defendants and can change ac-
cording to the facts of each case.
III. CONCLUSION
Absent Congressional amendments, SOX's ambiguities will have
to be resolved through litigation. The process of having lawyers
promote, and courts ultimately decide, the resolution of ambigu-
ous legislation is further frustrated where, as is the case with
SOX, formal legislative history is lacking. Normally, a court faced
with unclear legislation will turn first to formal legislative history
for clarity; however, there is very little history for a court to exam-
ine when faced with a Sarbanes-Oxley ambiguity. Moreover, the
enormity of the corporate scandals created an atmosphere in
which members of Congress wanted to avoid the appearance of
condoning such behavior. As a result, meaningful debate, espe-
cially as voiced by opponents, and the usual resulting compro-
mises over legislative measures, are nearly absent from the Act's
history.
It appears that SOX's ambiguities are rooted in Congress' at-
tempt to assuage the concerns of a public facing a barrage of cor-
porate transgressions in an already weakened economy. Clearly,
it was not a concerted effort to change the application of securities
laws to private plaintiffs because requirements of the PSLRA and
the Supreme Court's holding in Central Bank are untouched and
remain valid. However, as the discussion regarding certification
provisions indicated, SOX may provide supplementary avenues
168. Id.
169. Id.
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through which the requirements of the PSLRA and ruling in Cen-
tral Bank may be satisfied. Thus, the direction of securities litiga-
tion in a post Sarbanes-Oxley forum will be battled out and finally
resolved in court. What is unknown is whether such litigation will
arrive at courts as the sporadic case representing a distinct issue,
or as a 'floodgate' of litigation, the resolution of which will produce
a long-term impact in the area of private securities litigation.
Kourtney T. Cowart

